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This article offers a systematic reading of the introduction to Augustin-Louis Cauchy’s landmark 1821
mathematical textbook, the Cours d’analyse. Despite its emblematic status in the history of mathematical anal-
ysis and, indeed, of modern mathematics as a whole, Cauchy’s introduction has been more a source for sugges-
tive quotations than an object of study in its own right. Cauchy’s short mathematical metatext offers a rich
snapshot of a scholarly paradigm in transition. A close reading of Cauchy’s writing reveals the complex modal-
ities of the author’s epistemic positioning, particularly with respect to the geometric study of quantities in space,
as he struggles to refound the discipline on which he has staked his young career.
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Cet article présente une interpretation systematique de l’introduction du Cours d’analyse par Augustin-Louis
Cauchy, une texte mathématique de grande importance publié en 1821. Malgré sa significance dans l’histoire de
l’analyse mathématique et bien dans toute l’histoire des mathématiques modernes, cette préface a été plus une
source des citations qu’un propre objet pour étudier. La brève métatexte mathématique de Cauchy donne un por-
trait riche d’un paradigme mathématique en transition. Une lecture proche de ce texte nous laisse voir les modalités
complexes du positionnement épistémologique de l’auteur, particulièrement à propos des quantités géométriques
dans l’espace, quand il lutte pour re-fonder son sujet d’étude.
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God, king, and geometry 369d’analyse has been, in the historical literature, more a source for suggestive quotations than
an object of study in its own right. In his introduction, Cauchy definitively outlines what
were to be the foundations of his new rigorous mathematics, invoking both specific mathe-
matical practices and their underlying philosophical principles. His text is thus a fecund
encapsulation of the mathematical and epistemological work which would make him “the
man who taught rigorous analysis to all of Europe” [Grabiner, 1981, p. 14].1
But Cauchy’s short introduction is far more than a mere synopsis. A closer reading
reveals it to be an active site of rhetorical positioning. This is especially the case if one fol-
lows Bottazzini’s [2001, p. 34] suggestion to read the Course not as a textbook but as a man-
ifesto. To appreciate better the significance of Cauchy’s introduction, this article puts
together three sources of evidence that have not been systematically combined hitherto.
First, it offers a consideration of the introduction as a whole, detailing the relationships
between the great variety of claims made therein. Second, it considers these relationships
in the context of the extant detailed archival work on the influences and allusions in Cau-
chy’s writing.2 Finally, it begins the work of incorporating this analysis into broader histor-
ical frameworks.3
Read in this new light, Cauchy’s introduction becomes a new sort of emblem—not of the
dawn of modern analytic rigor, but of the specific rhetorical and philosophical negotiation
such a revolution entails. It spans a mere seven full pages of the more than 1,500 pages of
published material coming directly from Cauchy’s teaching at the École Royale Polytech-
nique,4 but in this short space it attempts radically to rework the ground of an entire dis-
cipline. As a brief and prefatory text, most of the work it does is through a deftly
orchestrated web of allusions—to people, practices, and philosophical principles.5 Choices
that appear innocuous to a present-day eye, such as his allusion to Maclaurin’s theorem on
p. vi, become part of a dramatic staging of principle when viewed through the lens of con-
temporary disputes and discussions.
Cauchy’s prefatory drama is set in three acts, corresponding to the three long paragraphs
composing the bulk of the introduction. Each act enunciates the proper place of its subject
within that subject’s particular context. Thus, at the start, Cauchy positions his Course in
Analysis within the engineering curriculum and the educational and civil missions of the
École. In the second act, the one that has drawn the most attention from historians of mathe-
matics to date, Cauchy elaborates the proper position of algebra and its associated methods
within mathematics as a whole. The third act entertains a consideration of the proper place
of mathematics in the spectrum of knowledge and within a broader society. The introduc-
tion concludes with a brief epilogue supplementing the expressions of gratitude with which
Cauchy began.
This article treats these three acts in their order of appearance, arguing that Cauchy’s
rhetorical achievement was to stage his teaching, methods, and discipline in such a way1 For the work’s spread and influence see also Belhoste [1991], Grattan-Guinness [1980, p. 97], and
Grattan-Guinness [1990, pp. 795–796].
2 Particularly Belhoste [1984, 1985, 1991]; Gilain [1989].
3 E.g., Richards [1991, 1992, 2006].
4 The tabulation is from Gilain [1989, p. 24].
5 Introductions to mathematical or scientific textbooks can be seen to constitute a genre in their
own right, with a distinctive combination of formal and referential conventions. While I restrict my
attention just to Cauchy’s introduction, there are ample grounds for further analysis within the
broader corpus of prefatory enunciations of his period and discipline.
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introduction shows to a new degree the extent to which Cauchy’s rigor was founded on
an edifice of interconnected assertions spanning every level of knowledge, from the local
to the universal.2. Staging the Course
Founded in 1795, the École Polytechnique was from its inception France’s premier training
ground for the military, social, and civil engineers who were to be vital to the post-Revolutionary
French state. Gilain [1989] and Belhoste [1991] have meticulously documented the mathematical
debates that shaped Cauchy’s education at the École, beginning in 1805 at the age of 16, and his
reception as a new faculty member from 1816.6 In brief, Cauchy’s studies were marked by a mas-
sive reorganization and militarization of the École by Napoléon’s government, which coincided
with an increased emphasis on analysis as a cornerstone of the engineering curriculum. Taught
by Sylvestre Lacroix with the help of André-Marie Ampère, his répétiteur, the analysis course
was centered on a geometrically derived limit concept.7
This basis for the course was challenged not long after Cauchy’s departure in an 1810 official
review, which criticized the curriculum as too theoretical and recommended the replacement
of the limit concept with those of infinitely large and infinitely small quantities. These latter
were deemed more suitable to the practical needs of engineers, and they were joined by more
applied methods in the regular curriculum. The École’s politically active student body was
disbanded by royal ordinance in April, 1815, following Bonapartist demonstrations on the heels
of the 1814 Bourbon Restoration, and Pierre Simon Laplace was charged with reorganizing
the school for its 1816 reopening. Among Laplace’s politically deft moves was replacing the
politically liberal analysis instructor Poinsot with the ardent Catholic royalist Cauchy,
who was joined by his mentor and ally Ampère as an instructor and by fellow Catholic
Gaspard-Gustave de Coriolis as his répétiteur. Cauchy’s early years as professor of analysis
were marked by sweeping changes to the curriculum and sweeping criticisms from the École’s
authorities. Chief among his critics was the politically liberal professor of geometry and
applied analysis Francois Arago, who singled out Cauchy’s reversion to the limit concept
in place of infinitely small quantities as particularly egregious, though the stubborn and
irreverent Cauchy gave his colleagues many further grounds for complaint.
It is in this light that Cauchy begins his introduction with a deferential gesture, thanking
his elder-statesman colleagues Laplace and Siméon-Denis Poisson for having been “willing
to guide my first steps in the scientific profession, and . . . having testified to the desire to see6 For further context within Cauchy’s career see Iacobacci [1965], Belhoste [1985], and Bottazzini
[1992]. within the history of the École see Belhoste [1994, 2001], Chatzis [1994], as well as Gillispie
[2004, pp. 520–540]. Dahan Dalmedico [1992] exhaustively chronicles Cauchy’s role in reshaping the
French scholarly elite during this period, while Fox [1974], Grattan-Guinness [1990], and Fraser
[1997] give related histories less focused on Cauchy. Finally, Alder [1995, 1999], Rusnock [1995], and
Gillispie [2004, pp. 652–655] place Cauchy’s mathematical context in wider revolutionary trends
with respect to governance and education.
7 On Lacroix’s limit concept and the analysis curriculum of this period, see Gilain [1989, p. 5] and
Richards [2006, pp. 710–711]. In particular, Lacroix defines limits in terms of the vanishing
magnitudes of successive differences, invoking a vocabulary shared between geometry and analysis.
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humble acknowledgement of his professional debt to these two prominent mathematicians.
Laplace’s influence at the École extended well beyond his role in the 1816 reorganization;
he then served as one of the school’s principal examiners and remained its vocal advocate as
a recently elected member of the Académie Francaise.9 Cauchy first encountered Laplace
through his father’s involvement with the senate formed after the uprising of 18 Brumaire,
of which Laplace was a member, and Laplace had indeed helped to shape Cauchy’s earliest
steps in the discipline. Poisson was an early standout at the École and was hired immedi-
ately upon his graduation in 1800. By the time of Cauchy’s publication, Poisson had begun
serving on the Conseil royal de l’Université, a post of national importance, and his own
Traité de mécanique was a prominent attempt at pedagogical reform [Arnold, 1981, pp.
23–24; Costabel, 1981, pp. 3–4, 9]. Poisson, too, had helped introduce Cauchy at a very early
age to Parisian mathematical circles. More importantly, however, both Laplace and Poisson
were highly respected and influential figures within the mathematical profession. By citing
them, Cauchy vests himself and his work in the authority of these much-better-esteemed
professors. Given his controversial status within the École, Cauchy could not dispense with
their support, real or symbolic.
The opening sentence also contains the first of two expressions in the first paragraph of
the usefulness of his text. Here, the Course is being published “for the greater utility to stu-
dents”10 and further down Cauchy claims to “have presented developments which could be
useful to Professors and to Students of the Royal Colleges.”11 At the time of the Course’s
publication, the opacity of Cauchy’s lectures was a major point of contention between the
instructor and the councils at the École responsible for evaluating both the curriculum and
his performance presenting it. Although his text was distinctly devoid of discussions specific
to engineering, it was still to be useful to students of the subject as a foundational text.
Indeed, its hoped-for utility extended not just to professors and students, but “to those
who would make a special study of analysis” (ibid.). The same text could serve two func-
tions for two audiences. It could provide the analytic foundations necessary for advanced
study in any field of engineering, and it could form the basis of a concerted study of analysis
in its own right.
This vision for the text directly opposed the contentions of Arago and his allies, who
insisted that the Course’s emphasis on foundational concepts did nothing but distract from
analysis’s useful applications. The paragraph responds to Arago in one further way. Part of
Arago’s criticism of Cauchy’s course is that it failed to adhere to explicit instructions from
the École’s administration to make infinitesimals, rather than limits, the conceptual core of
the course.12 Where Cauchy writes that he has “been unable to dispense with making the8 Quelques personnes, qui ont bien voulu guider mes premiers pas dans la carrière des sciences, et
parmi lesquelles je citerai avec reconnaissance MM. Laplace et Poisson, ayant témoigné le desir de
me voir publier le Cours d’analyse de l’École royale polytechnique . . . [Cauchy, 1821, p. i]. All
translations are my own. Since this paper’s initial preparation, Bradley and Sandifer [2009] have
published a full English translation of the Course’s second edition.
9 On Laplace’s prominence in this period, see Gillispie [1997, pp. 167–168, 177, 277].
10 . . . pour la plus grande utilité des élèves [Cauchy, 1821, p. i].
11 . . . j’ai présenté des développemens qui peuvent être utiles soit aux Professeurs et aux Élèves des
Colléges royaux, soit à ceux qui veulent faire une étude spéciale de l’analyse [Cauchy, 1821, p. ii].
12 Cauchy’s use of infinitely small quantities has elicited much discussion in the secondary literature,
particularly in analyses of Cauchy’s errors and omissions. See, e.g., Laugwitz [1987].
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infinitesimal calculus,”13 the remark may well be colored by a shade of resentment. He has
been unable to dispense with infinitesimals because of explicit mandates from the École,
against his better judgement. Indeed, Gilain [1989, p. 12] has argued that the section intro-
ducing infinitesimals was most likely inserted late in the preparation of Cauchy’s
manuscript.
Thus, in a few turns of phrase at the start of his introduction, Cauchy seeks to answer a
host of outstanding questions about his politically opportune appointment, his ability to
teach students of engineering, and his willingness to engage with members of the French
mathematical establishment, even as he was moving quickly to supplant them.
3. Geometries and algebras
Cauchy’s introduction is best remembered for its oft-quoted statement of method, which
opens the second paragraph:13 En
princ
[Cauc
14 Qu
mani
15 Gr
16 Se
centu
geom
17 I u
by CRegarding methods, I have sought to give them all the rigor one requires in geometry, in
such a way as never to resort to reasons drawn from the generality of algebra.14The conventional interpretation of this passage is that Cauchy here contrasts the unrigor-
ous use of algebraic formalisms by his mathematical predecessors, particularly in the eigh-
teenth century, with the Euclidean geometric ideal of purely deductive mathematics.15 This
is of course true, but something is missing if one leaves the interpretation there.
The crucial distinction between geometry and algebra, for Cauchy, signified far more
than the contrast of unguarded formalism against rigorous foundations. The difference
comes from a double meaning, dating to the Early Moderns, of both terms.16 In the second
act of Cauchy’s introduction, geometry refers not just to the deductive more geometrico, or
geometric method, but also to the Euclidean study of quantities in space.17 By the turn of
the nineteenth century, the two meanings of geometry had largely parted and gone their
separate ways. Philosophers ranging from Descartes to Hobbes to Spinoza applied the geo-
metric method to nature, God, the mind, law, government, and ethics. Meanwhile, the ana-
lytic geometry of the seventeenth century had wedded the study of space and quantity to
new algebraic methods that had less and less to do with what was seen as Euclid’s anti-
quated deductive approach [Mahoney, 1980; Richards, 2006].
While there existed a wide variety of views concerning algebraic methods among
Cauchy’s contemporaries and predecessors, there emerges in Cauchy’s pivotal statement
of method a similar double meaning for algebra, one which was certainly consistent with
a great many of the meanings then in circulation. Invoking “the generality of algebra,”parlant de la continuité des fonctions, je n’ai pu me dispenser de faire connaıˆtre les propriétés
ipales des quantités infiniment petites, propriétés qui servent de base au calcul infinitésimal
hy, 1821, p. ii].
ant aux méthodes, j’ai cherché à leur donner toute la rigueur qu’on exige en géométrie, de
ère à ne jamais recourir aux raisons tirées de la généralité de l’algèbre [Cauchy, 1821, p. ii].
abiner [1981, pp. 30, 164] gives an exemplary statement to this effect.
e Mahoney’s [1980] overview of the emergence of algebra in Europe during the seventeenth
ry and Høyrup’s [1996] study of the Early Modern European appropriation of Euclidean
etry and its philosophical principles.
se the modern phrase “quantities in space” to encompass the variety of geometric terms used
auchy and his contemporaries, including grandeur and quantité.
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algebra had both philosophical and mathematical registers. Mathematically, algebra meant
using abstract formal symbols and manipulations to solve mathematical problems. From
the Early Moderns onward, algebraic manipulations came to be characterized by their
detachment from the physical interpretations at the base of Euclidean geometry, with
algebraic formalism viewed as an “instrument of discovery in its own right” [Grosholz,
1980, p. 161; Mahoney, 1980, p. 142]. Where the abstractions of Euclidean proofs owed
their allegiance to in-principle realizable physical-geometric entities, algebraic formalisms
were unmoored from whatever meaningful problem brought them into existence. Without
constant regard for their geometric meaning, such formalisms easily could and routinely did
produce such physical absurdities as negative or imaginary quantities.18
Algebra’s philosophical meaning was closely tied to its mathematical one. No one spoke
of a more algebraico, but algebra’s mathematical contrast to geometry placed it in opposi-
tion to geometry’s philosophical valuation as well. Algebraic methods could be seen as
powerful and fruitful, but lacking in the foundational geometric rigor which, at least in
the French eighteenth century, was widely regarded as superfluous and pedantic [Mahoney,
1980, p. 147; Richards, 2006]. To an algebraic mathematician, Richards argues, the “rigor of
geometry” simply got in the way. The same formalisms that allowed negative numbers and
other monstrosities proved their ultimate worth in the mathematical truths they brought to
light. Algebra thus became a pragmatic method—a means to ends that would speak for
themselves. As a philosophy, algebra meant doing mathematics for the sake of what it could
accomplish and without care for the petty details of its premises. Below, we shall see
evidence of this view in the writings of Cauchy and his predecessors.
It is clear that Cauchy’s introduction sought to replace a philosophical algebraism with a
philosophical geometrism. Less clear is the extent to which this substitution relied on a
similar substitution in the mathematical realm. This reliance is hidden in large part because
Cauchy’s is, on the surface, a thoroughly algebraic text in its mathematics. It is, for instance,
utterly devoid of diagrams, which are a hallmark of geometric exposition. But mathemat-
ical geometrism enters nonetheless. To see how it does so in the introduction, it will help to
reconsider a canonical example from the mathematical exposition.193.1. Geometry in the intermediate value theorem
Grabiner’s classic study of the origins of Cauchy’s program of rigor takes his proof of
the intermediate value theorem as a hallmark of his supposedly algebra-rooted approach
[Grabiner, 1981, pp. 49, 71].20 Roughly stated, the intermediate value theorem says that if18 This is not to say that there were not physical interpretations at that time for the products of these
formalisms. Rather, they lacked the a priori sensibility typically associated with the positive
magnitudes of Euclidean geometry: one can give a physical interpretation to 1 (or its square root)
but this does not help one to draw a triangle with that area.
19 The argument that follows should not be read as an attempt to adjudicate the ultimate logical or
mathematical status of Cauchy’s Course. Below, I offer a geometric and intuitive reading of
Cauchy’s introduction in light of a strong tradition in the history of mathematics of understanding
the contents of his Course to be anything but geometrical and intuition-based. In so arguing, I wish
to stress the often surprising affronts to conventional interpretations that a close examination of
important texts like Cauchy’s can provide.
20 Cf. Boyer [1968, p. 563] for Cauchy’s purported algebraism.
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value in between. Grabiner translates a proof from Cauchy’s third appendix. This closely
resembles proofs of the intermediate value theorem that found favor in the second half
of the nineteenth century and continue to be taught today. There, Cauchy describes the sub-
division of an interval into smaller and smaller parts until a point can be found where the
continuous function exactly achieves the value of interest. But this is not the only proof of
the theorem in Cauchy’s text.
In Grabiner’s [1981, p. 71] words, the proof in the appendix shows that “Unlike his
predecessors, Cauchy was not trying to approximate a root, but to prove its existence.”
Grabiner does acknowledge that the proof was based on a well-established approximation
procedure.21 Cauchy himself seems to side with this latter reading, describing the proof
as “furnishing the numerical solution of the equation f ðxÞ ¼ b”22 and placing it in an
appendix on numerical methods whose main focus is the numerical determination of
algebraic roots. If the primary purpose of his more famous proof of the intermediate value
theorem was, contrary to its later use, merely to aid in numerical approximation (a task
Cauchy deemed secondary to the work of rigorous mathematics), then it behooves one
to look more closely at the theorem’s proof in the main body of Cauchy’s text.
Cauchy’s first proof of the intermediate value theorem is the fourth proof he presents
after giving his definition for continuity. It follows what Grattan-Guinness [1970, p. 377]
dismisses as a “naive geometrical argument.” In plain prose, Cauchy describes “the curve
which has for its equation y ¼ f ðxÞ” in the plane and the level line y ¼ b (Cauchy’s term
is droite, the same term used for straight lines in Euclidean prose) corresponding to the
value b in question.23 To complete the proof, Cauchy observes that the level line falls by
hypothesis between the vertical coordinates of the function at either end of the interval
under consideration, so “the above mentioned curve cannot but meet [it] in the interval.”24
The whole discussion takes less than a page.
The first proof is remarkable precisely because it utterly fails to comply with the standards of
rigor later associated with Cauchy. It does not invoke his definition of continuity. It uses
analytic language only incidentally. And yet nowhere does Cauchy imply that this first proof
is in any way inferior to the“purely analytic”one in the appendix. Indeed, the textual priority of
the proof in chapter two would seem to suggest that one should rather turn to Cauchy’s “naive
geometrical argument” for insight into the particular form of rigor he aimed to espouse.
Grattan-Guinness [1980, p. 111] points out that this proof is in keeping with the contem-
porary custom of describing functions as though they were monotonically increasing.2521 The point is also made by Freudenthal [1971, pp. 382–383] and Katz [2009, p. 773].
22 . . . fournir la résolution numérique de l’équation f ðxÞ ¼ b [Cauchy, 1821, p. 44].
23 Pour établir la proposition précédente, il suffit de faire voir que la courbe qui a pour équation
y ¼ f ðxÞ rencontrera une ou plusieurs fois la droite qui a pour équation y ¼ b . . . [Cauchy, 1821,
p. 44].
24 . . . ce qu’elle ne peut faire sans rencontrer dans l’intervalle la courbe ci’dessus mentionnée
[Cauchy, 1821, p. 44].
25 Cauchy nowhere stipulates that the curve must be monotone, nor does it need to be for his
argument to follow (to the extent that it follows for the monotone case). Nevertheless, in light of the
context in which Cauchy wrote and the historiographical and mathematical contexts in which he
would later be placed, it remains significant that Cauchy makes no effort to describe the curve as
anything other than monotonic. Cf. Lakatos [1979, p. 129] who characterizes a variety of
interpretations of functions and their continuity from Cauchy and his contemporaries.
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sists in the Cartesian plane and, as Benis-Sinaceur [1973, p. 107] observes, comports to thor-
oughly geometric intuitions—a practice that can be found elsewhere in Cauchy’s
pedagogical writings as well.26 Fundamentally, the theorem holds for Cauchy because,
when translated into geometric terms, it describes two curves that must necessarily
cross—the continuous function and the level line y ¼ b. No further argument is needed.
The formal definition of continuity need not even be invoked. What was important for
Cauchy was “the rigor of geometry” in the face of the “generality of algebra”: his proof
by geometric intuition could even stray from the geometric method (and, in particular,
the citation of antecedent propositions or definitions) because its evidence was so firmly
rooted in the mathematical sense of geometry.
In the light of his main proof, Cauchy’s proof in the appendix appears discernibly different
as well. One starts to notice the subtle encroachments of geometric thinking in the“purely ana-
lytic” exposition, such as his free use of the concept of “opposite sign”—something Katz
[2009, p. 733], for instance, conveniently elides by adding the criteria “f ðaÞ < 0 and
f ðbÞ > 0” in his recent presentation of Cauchy’s argument. The proof proceeds by construct-
ing two sequences of x-values narrowing in on a single limit but having opposite signs, a com-
pletely unproblematic procedure when one imagines a monotonic section of a function
crossing thex-axis but one whose certainty of success is much less obvious when the function’s
sign oscillates rapidly near the limit of the x-sequences. The limit concept Cauchy invokes to
close the proof is one steeped in geometric intuition [Benis-Sinaceur, 1973, p. 109].
3.2. Sin and expiation
Cauchy’s new rigorous mathematics, then, was to be vested in both senses of geometry.
Having seen the manifestation of this program in the intermediate value theorem, one can
more easily discern its appearance in what follows in Cauchy’s introduction: a list of faults
found in the mathematics of his predecessors and a list of restrictions “which perhaps
appear a little harsh at first”27 but which serve to “make all uncertainty disappear.”28
His two-tiered presentation takes the form of a Catholic confession, moving from an
accounting of sins to a program for their absolution.
Belhoste [1991, pp. 136–142] documents Cauchy’s fierce reactionary Catholicism and the
inquisitorial reputation it earned him among the French academic elite. Indeed, Cauchy
exhibited few reservations about drawing religious and political controversies into his
assessments of others’ scientific work. Regarding his own work, Cauchy’s insistence on doc-
trinal authority helps to explain the manner in which he aimed to restore rigor to analysis.
Specifically, Cauchy’s list of sins and remedies echoes the confessional doctrine of the
Council of Trent, which stressed the detailed and specific enunciation of sins so that
through a knowledge of their causes the priest may apply an appropriate penance [Bernard,
1911, p. 904; Ortolan, 1911, pp. 953–954]. If the shortcomings of his predecessors’ mathe-
matics could be enumerated and corrected, Cauchy could aspire to produce a right mathe-
matics governed by rigorous discipline, and thus to mirror the righteous Catholic governed
by religious discipline.26 For instance, Cauchy [1823, p. 8].
27 . . . je me suis vu forcé d’admettre plusieurs propositions qui paraıˆtront peut-être un peu dures au
premier abord [Cauchy, 1821, p. iv].
28 . . . je fais disparaıˆtre toute incertitude [Cauchy, 1821, p. iii].
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ence on his presentation in this section of the introduction. The form of Cauchy’s enunci-
ation coexists with a wide variety of religious tropes and styles, and was by no means
exclusive to the particular context of the Catholic confession. But taken in the context of
Cauchy’s well-known religious commitments, this simple structural observation affords
an enriched view of the epistemic maneuvers to come in the introduction’s third act. In
the present passage, Cauchy urges mathematicians to restrict their claims and their actions
in order to validate their results. In the third act, not just mathematicians but all would-be
producers of knowledge must likewise conform to modes of knowing that constrain what
each can say to the other. This latter assertion, as Belhoste [1991] notes, has strong roots in
the Restoration-era ultramontane orthodoxy that shaped Cauchy’s strongly held views on
knowledge and authority.
Having diagnosed the overarching problem of the dangerous generality of algebra in his
opening sentence, Cauchy specifies the particular sins manifest in that generality. They
involve “the passage from convergent to divergent series, and from real quantities to imag-
inary expressions” and “attribut[ing] to algebraic formulae an indefinite extension.” “Most
of these formulae,” explains Cauchy, “subsist only under certain conditions, and for certain
values of the quantities they contain.” He continues,29 . . .
expre
indéfi
cond
cond
fais d
entre
aux q
30 A
31 Se
counBy determining these conditions and these values, and in fixing in a precise way the
meaning of the notations of which I avail myself, I make all uncertainty disappear;
and so the different formulae no longer present anything more than relations between
real quantities, relations which are always easy to verify by the substitution of numbers
for the quantities themselves.29Equipped with a geometric reading of the intermediate value theorem, Cauchy’s list of
sins is subtly transformed. In the conventional reading, each sin is a straying by formal alge-
bra from the foundations of the more geometrico. In each case, an innocuous formalism for
a convergent series or real variable loses sight of its conditions of validity and comes to rep-
resent, for the incautious algebraist, a divergent series or imaginary expression.30 Formulae,
for Cauchy, need always to remain loyal to their foundations and are justified only in spe-
cific domains of validity.
His is a problem about foundations and the more geometrico, yes, but it is also a problem
about mathematical geometry. It is not enough to fix domains of validity for one’s formal-
isms; one must do so to preserve their relevance to “relations between real quantities,” the
very relations underlying the Euclidean study of magnitude.31 The generality of algebra is
insidious only insofar as it lets one stray from the study of geometrically valid quantities.
Imaginary quantities, with their squares of negative area, and divergent series, with theirdans le passage des séries convergentes aux séries divergentes, et des quantités réelles aux
ssions imaginaires . . .. [Elles] tendent à faire attribuer aux formules algébriques une étendue
nie, tandis que, dans la réalité, la plupart de ces formules subsistent uniquement sous certaines
itions, et pour certaines valeurs des quantités qu’elles renferment. En déterminant ces
itions et ces valeurs, et en fixant d’une manière précise le sens des notations dont je me sers, je
isparaıˆtre toute incertitude; et alors les différentes formules ne présentent plus que des relations
les quantités réelles, relations qu’il est toujours facile de vérifier par la substitution des nombres
uantités elles-mêmes [Cauchy, 1821, p. iii–iv].
related interpretation is given by Benis-Sinaceur [1973, p. 105].
ction 3.3, below, discusses just how close Cauchy’s “real quantities” were to their Euclidean
terparts.
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Fixing algebraic conditions for the validity of algebraic formalisms, Cauchy guarantees
their geometric certainty without having to resort to the tedium of actual Euclidean geo-
metric proofs.
The conditions themselves bear out this geometric interpretation. Each statement in this
section of the paragraph is a specific act of policing the grounds of a certain type of perilous
formalism where it might stray from geometric validity.32 Divergent series cannot be said to
have a sum, for they no longer represent the stable accretion of geometric magnitudes to
which the sum ought to correspond. Imaginary equations can only be said to have meaning
as pairs of coupled equations between real quantities, and so become just another form of
Cauchy’s (and Euclid’s) prized relations. If an equation violates the conditions of its formu-
lation, it must either be discarded or furnished with a new set of conditions.33 In short, alge-
bra must be both mathematically and methodologically geometric.
Cauchy finishes the second paragraph of his introduction by stressing that “the happy
necessity of putting more precision in theories” can also “furnish several subjects of
research which are not without importance” in themselves.34 Not only do his restrictions
on the generality of algebra rescue its geometric validity, but they are also genuinely pro-
ductive. A good Catholic, Cauchy insists that proper restraint gives one the certitude atten-
dant to knowing one’s methodological place as well as the further reward of providing new
forms and avenues of production, inquiry, and enlightenment.
3.3. The two faces of algebra
The heart of Cauchy’s critique of the generality of algebra is baldly stated just after the
famous statement of method:32 Be
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si vanReasons of this type . . . cannot be considered, it seems to me, but as inductions so as to
sometimes apprehend the truth, but which agree little with the vaunted exactitude of the
mathematical sciences.35Algebra’s most heinous sin, it seems, is that it is useful, that it is capable of producing the
right answers even though they are justified with the wrong reasons. Whether the target of
the barb in Cauchy’s statement of method was Swiss mathematician Leonhard Euler [Gi-
lain, 1989, p. 24], Cauchy’s French forebear Joseph-Louis Lagrange [Bottazzini, 2001, p. 33],
or Laplace and Poisson [Belhoste, 1991, p. 51], Cauchy’s criticism is clear: these great math-
ematicians may have obtained genuine results, but they were not performing genuine
mathematics.
Here, Cauchy invokes the dual status of algebra at its most basic. Algebra is a powerful
extension of geometric methods. Cauchy explains thatnis-Sinaceur [1973, pp. 102–103] offers a similar reading.
is precept is not itself explicitly geometric. But in the context of the others it has a clear
etric interpretation: if an equation loses reference to its initial geometric referents, something
be done to restore its access to a nonformal geometric foundation.
les propositions de cette nature [the conditions just discussed], entraıˆnant l’heureuse nécessité
ttre plus de précision dans les théories, . . . fournissent plusieurs sujets de recherches qui ne sont
ans importance [Cauchy, 1821, p. v].
s raisons de cette espèce, . . . ne peuvent être considérées, ce me semble, que comme des
tions propres à faire presentir quelquefois la vérité, mais qui s’accordent peu avec l’exactitude
tée des sciences mathématiques. [Cauchy, 1821, p. ii–iii].
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378 M.J. BaranyThe use of symbolic expressions or equations is often a means of simplifying the calcu-
lations and of writing results which are quite complicated in appearance in an abridged
form.36But algebra is not just powerful. It is also an impostor. Algebraic techniques allow one to
derive results with genuine geometric meaning. But by moving the mathematician one step
away from geometric objects themselves, algebra allows him to stray from geometry and
produce statements with no geometric meaning whatsoever. Algebra works “sometimes,”
but without the utmost of vigilance it is easy to lose track of which times those are.
The situation is one of grammatological supplementarity.37 In Cauchy’s view, algebra
begins as a helpful aid to geometry. As its power and influence grows, however, algebra
comes to displace geometry, usurping its mathematical priority by exposing its relative
impotence. Cauchy echoes a common historical refrain. His reassertion of the primacy of
geometry is a desperate bid to win control over an algebraic golem run amok.
The sentiment is well encapsulated in Cauchy’s first Note at the end of the course. Alge-
bra, he writes,is an artifice that augments the resources of analysis; but whenever one wants to use it, it
is necessary to take heed of the following conventions.38Seeking “to avoid every type of confusion in algebraic language and writing”39 becomes the
object of a number of correctives meant to keep the artifice of algebra true to the geomet-
rically meaningful results it would elucidate, including the ones listed in the introduction,
discussed in the previous section. In his Preliminaries and in Note I, Cauchy reduces alge-
braic formalisms to their fundamental geometric referents, defining numbers and quantities
in terms of operations on positive magnitudes of a fixed type (that is, dimension)—the same
magnitudes at the core of Euclidean geometry [Cauchy, 1821, pp. 1–3 et seq., 403–404 et
seq.]. That Cauchy spends some seven pages of the Course on the distinction between po-
sitive and negative numbers indicates just how important it was for him to rid algebra of
the most basic sins of its formalism.
But algebra’s straying from Euclidean geometry is a double straying. It is only possible
when the algebraist also loses sight of the more geometrico itself. Thus, Cauchy both insists
on the primacy of relations between real quantities and puts his methodological correctives
in the form of foundational rules in the axiomatic tradition. The only way to ensure that
algebraic methods produce geometric results (in the mathematical sense) is to develop
the algebraic exposition according to the more geometrico, not even taking such basic
notions as an algebraic variable or constant for granted.40 Without such a progression from
fundamentals, analysis could never have access to the certainty built into geometric rigor.emploi des expressions ou équations symboliques est souvent un moyen de simplifier les calculs,
crire sous une forme abrégée des résultats assez compliqués en apparence [Cauchy, 1821,
3].
r a foundational statement, see Derrida [1974].
reste, rien n’empêche de représenter les quantités par de simples lettres aussi bien que les
res. C’est un artifice qui augmente les ressources de l’analyse; mais lorsqu’on veut en faire
, il est nécessaire d’avoir égard aux conventions suivantes [Cauchy, 1821, p. 404].
ur éviter toute espèce de confusion dans le langage et l’écriture algébriques . . . [Cauchy, 1821,
., Cauchy [1821, p. 4].
God, king, and geometry 379He has been “forced to admit several propositions”41 because the algebra’s referential loy-
alty to the objects of mathematical geometry could only come from a simultaneous insis-
tence for algebra on a new fealty to philosophical geometry.
Importantly, however, Cauchy did not address the algebraic heresy by doing away with
the method altogether. Engineers at the École would still need algebraic methods, and Cau-
chy himself could not have doubted the utility of algebra’s formal approach. He remedied
the sins of algebra with rules of practice that were fundamentally algebraic, offering algebra
a geometric redemption in algebraic terms. In so doing, he subtly rewrote the rules of the
more geometrico. His regrounding of algebra admitted the possibility that formal algebraic
rules (in Cauchy’s case, those derived from mathematical geometry) could serve as the basis
for a rigorous mathematical practice which was practically and methodologically rooted
not in spatial geometry but in formal algebra. This possibility was taken up by the founda-
tionalists of the second half of the 19th century, in what Lancelot Hogben [1960] later called
“The Great Biopsy.” Where Cauchy “sought to give them all the rigor one requires in
geometry, in such a way as never to resort to reasons drawn from the generality of algebra,”
those such as Richard Dedekind could “resolve to . . . find a purely arithmetic . . . founda-
tion” and criticize their predecessors for “appeal[ing] to geometric notions or those sug-
gested by geometry” [Dedekind, 1948, pp. 1–2].
Cauchy’s geometric response, in both senses of geometry, to the generality of algebra
served at least two broader social functions. First, it offered a means by which Cauchy
could claim a well-founded certainty for his mathematics amidst the epistemic chaos Rich-
ards [2006] describes in post-Revolution France. Second, as Belhoste [1991, p. 213] suggests,
moves such as Cauchy’s helped mathematics lead a movement across many disciplines in
the first half of the 19th century to increasingly to assert control over their respective con-
tent and standards.42 Mathematical rigor has an inward-looking role of shoring up the pro-
cess of knowledge creation, but this shoring-up cannot be divorced from its necessary effect
of limiting and regulating access both to the tangible institutional grounds of the discipline
and to the epistemic grounds on which knowledge claims can be made. It would be mislead-
ing to say that Cauchy’s mathematics was influential despite its being difficult, for its diffi-
culty was a necessary social condition for the epistemic work that would win him fame.43
Right method is more than merely a restriction of cognitive possibilities. It is a restriction of
participatory possibilities as well.4. Staging mathematics
Where Cauchy’s second act began to draw walls around a specific domain of mathemat-
ical practice, his third act made these divisions sharp and clear. In the second act, Cauchy
sought to narrow the range of what could produce mathematics. To this, in the third act,
Cauchy adds prohibitions on what mathematics could produce.
There was an integral connection between the inputs and outputs of mathematical practice.
Cauchy was responding not just to an irresponsible recourse to the generality of algebra. He41 Cauchy [1821, p. iv], op. cit.
42 See also Alexander [2006] and Porter [1995, part 3], which discuss two related narrative
dimensions of this disciplinary transformation.
43 Belhoste [2003, p. 231] elaborates the social function of the difficulty of Cauchy’s mathematics in
the context of the École. In particular, he points to the elitist function of Cauchy’s method, whose
effect was to erect ever greater barriers to mathematical participation by non-Polytechnicians.
380 M.J. Baranywas also faced, in the mathematics of his rivals, with a worldview where mathematics could
and should speak to anything and everything. Powerful but ungrounded methods were
justified when they could draw their legitimacy from the worldly results they produced. Only
by taking away this sphere of application from genuine mathematics could Cauchy replace it
as a regime of justification with his own foundational program.
To begin to understand the origins and purpose of Cauchy’s walling-in of mathematics,
consider Belhoste’s contention that Cauchy’s Catholic epistemology gave the mathemati-
cian a bipartite model of truth, with moral truths of the Church contrasted against the sci-
entific truths of the natural sciences. Belhoste [1991, pp. 216–217] claims that Cauchy’s
introduction places his mathematics squarely at the opposite end of the Catholic moral
order as an exemplar of scientific truth. In fact, Cauchy goes much farther than this simple
two-part distinction, though it no doubt grounded his decision to designate different ways
of knowing for different spheres of knowledge.
Cauchy writes explicitly of the ties between the production and application of mathemat-
ics to start his third paragraph:44 Au
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[CaucFor the rest, if I have sought, on the one hand, to perfect mathematical analysis, on the
other hand, I am far from pretending that this analysis should have to suffice for all the
rational sciences.44He explains that to be successful in the natural sciences one can only proceed by “observing
events and then submitting the evidence to calculation.”45 One must take care in reading
the phrase which follows. Cauchy begins his next sentence with a “But,” suggesting that
Belhoste may be right in grouping mathematics with the natural sciences. “But,” Cauchy
writes, “it would be a grave error to think that one only finds certainty in geometric dem-
onstrations, or in the testimony of the senses.”46 Cauchy preserves a role for mathematics in
the natural sciences, but he simultaneously construes them as fundamentally different. He
contrasts “geometric demonstrations” with “the testimony of the senses,” implying that the
latter have no place at all in mathematics, while the former may still be of use to other
sciences insofar as they support calculations.
The world can have nothing to say about mathematics, but at least in this limited capac-
ity mathematics can still tell something of the world. Cauchy goes on to make clear just how
limited a capacity this is. In so doing, he establishes a fundamental difference between the
truths of mathematics and the truths of society. Here is his pivotal sentence in full:But it would be a grave error to think that one only finds certainty in geometric demon-
strations, or in the testimony of the senses; and although no person until now has tried
to prove by analysis the existence of Augustus or of Louis XIV, every sensible man
will agree that this existence is as certain for him as the square of the hypotenuse or
Maclaurin’s theorem.47reste, si j’ai cherché, d’une part, à perfectionner l’analyse mathématique, de l’autre, je suis loin
étendre que cette analyse doive suffire à toutes les sciences de raisonnement [Cauchy, 1821, p. v].
à observer les faits et à soumettre ensuite les observations au calcul [Cauchy, 1821, p. vi].
e full quotation below.
ais ce serait une erreur grave de penser qu’on ne trouve la certitude que dans les démonstrations
étriques, ou dans le témoignage des sens; et quoique personne jusqu’à ce jour n’ait essayé de
er par l’analyse l’existence d’Auguste ou celle de LOUIS XIV, tout homme sensé conviendra que
existence est aussi certaine pour lui que le carré de l’hypotenuse ou le théorème de Maclaurin
hy, 1821, p. vi].
God, king, and geometry 381It would have been epistemic suicide for Cauchy to claim that the only truths were those of
geometry. Instead, he says something much more powerful, perfectly of a piece with the dis-
ciplinary enclosure movement he helped spur. For Cauchy, the truths of geometry compose
just one class of a wide variety of truths: mathematical, natural, moral, political, and so
forth. Before exploring how Cauchy develops this notion, some of his rhetorical choices de-
serve special remark.
It is no coincidence that Cauchy’s example of a social truth invokes iconic figures whose
respective command of the French monarchy and Roman Empire could not be doubted.
Indeed, there could be no better example for Cauchy of the possible transcendence of social
truths—every schoolchild in France would have known of these two giants. It was not just
that nobody could doubt the existence of these two rulers. Rather, the political facts of their
existence were just as certain as the truth of their mathematical counterparts.
With the square of the hypotenuse, Cauchy refers to the Pythagorean theorem, an arche-
typal example of ancient Euclidean geometry corresponding to his choice of an archetypal
Classical monarch. To this, he pairs a mathematical-analytic theorem of Maclaurin’s from
the century just prior to his own. The choice of the Scottish mathematician was not arbi-
trary. Cauchy was directly attacking his immediate forebears, particularly in France, and it
might have seemed contradictory to turn around and hold their work as an example of
certain knowledge. Maclaurin was sufficiently well-known and respected among French
mathematicians to make his theorem recognizable, but also sufficiently distant in both
space and time to dissociate his mathematics from that which Cauchy criticized.
Moreover, Maclaurin’s results regarding the representation of functions by power series
were a matter of important dispute among Cauchy and his contemporaries. Lagrange had
made such series the foundation of his theory of analytic functions, marking a sharp turn
from what Richards characterizes as the narrative approach to mathematics in 18th-cen-
tury France [Richards, 2006, pp. 709–710]. His influential series-based method had found
many adherents in the decades between Lagrange’s Théorie des fonctions analytiques and
Cauchy’s Course, but it does not figure at all in Cauchy’s foundational text. In the lectures
Cauchy published two years later, Cauchy explicitly denounced power series as a founda-
tion for calculus,48 calling attention to the uncertainties accompanying nonconvergent ser-
ies and devoting large portions of his 37th and 38th lectures to the convergence conditions
for Taylor and Maclaurin series [Cauchy, 1823, pp. v–vi, 145–152].49 His reference to
Maclaurin allowed Cauchy to assert scholarly authority over a topical result. Indeed,48 E.g.: . . . je l’espère, que les principes du calcul différentiel, et ses applications les plus importantes,
peuvent être facilement exposés, sans l’intervention des séries [Cauchy, 1823, p. vi]. (. . . I hope that
the principles of differential calculus, and its most important applications, can be easily stated
without the intervention of series.)
49 E.g.: Mais, malgré tout le respect que commande une si grande autorité [auteur de la Mécanique
analytique], la plupart des géomètres s’accordent maintenant à reconnaître l’incertitude des résultats
auxquels on peut être conduit par l’emploi de séries divergentes, et nous ajouterons que, dans
plusieurs cas, le théorème de TAYLOR semble fournir le développement d’une fonction en série
convergente, quoique la somme de la série diffère essentiellement de la fonction proposée [Cauchy,
1823, p. vi]. (But, despite all the respect such a great authority [Lagrange] commands, the majority of
mathematicians now agree to admit the uncertainty of results which one might achieve by the use of
divergent series, and we will add that, in several cases, Taylor’s theorem seems to produce the
development of a function as a convergent series, even though the sum of the series essentially differs
from the proposed function.)
382 M.J. BaranyMaclaurin series were among the chief formalisms to be tamed by the proscriptions
discussed above.
Cauchy’s citation of Maclaurin also had specific methodological overtones, invoking
positions championed by Maclaurin which were driven by a religious and ideological fervor
to match Cauchy’s own [Grabiner, 2004]. For while Maclaurin’s discoveries were much
lauded in turn-of-the-century France [Grabiner, 1997], the same cannot be said of his meth-
ods. Consider his treatment, indicative of his reputation by the end of the 18th century, in
an 1802 edition of Montucla’s50 widely-read Histoire des mathématiques:50 On
later
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raisoHis prolixity was somewhat superfluous. We can do nothing, in France, but laugh at the
attack of that ingenious visionary . . . M. Maclaurin has given . . . proofs multiplied by his
taste for ancient geometry.51Or again, explaining that Newton and his contemporaries had been charged with using false
or incomplete notions, he addsIt is true that at the time of this last attack, Maclaurin defended them and established
their principles on proofs in the manner of the ancients. But what tiring prolixity, what
circle of of reasoning is he not obliged to employ!52Cauchy found in Maclaurin a rigorous crusader before his time, one ardently and famously
loyal to the methods of the ancient geometers.
Just as Louis XIV was no ordinary king of France, Maclaurin’s was no ordinary theo-
rem. Cauchy picked the cream of each crop to represent their respective domains of knowl-
edge. And yet, for the particular claims Cauchy made—about the existence of kings and the
truth of theorems—it would seem that any sufficiently well-known monarchs or theorems
would do. It remains to account for the citation of Louis XIV over, for instance, the
ill-fated Louis XVI whose reign was overthrown by the French Revolution, or of Maclaurin’s
theorem over one from any of the leading lights of 18th-century French mathematics.
To see why, it is necessary to turn to the rhetorical force of Cauchy’s argument.
Cauchy’s introduction, as Bottazzini reminds us, does not merely rest on its empirical
claims. It is clear that in the previous section, where Cauchy makes an empirical list
of the remedies he has enacted for his mathematics, the list serves also as a normative
injunction for the mathematics of his colleagues, pupils, and other readers. It is not just that
Cauchy has modified his mathematics in the ensuing text, but that all mathematicians
should do the same. As a manifesto, the introduction’s blurring of the empirical and
normative allowed it to promulgate a dense catalogue of denunciations and reforms as
though their truth were as natural a question as that of who governed France. Seen normatively,
Seen normatively, Cauchy’s text argues not just that Louis XIV was the king of France but
that he should have been, not just that Maclaurin’s theorem is true but that it should be so:this volume’s authorship and its relation to the epistemological battles which Cauchy would
join, see Richards [2006, pp. 702, 707–708].
prolixité étoit assez superflue. Nous n’aurions fait en France que rire de l’attaque de cet
ieux visionnaire, qui traitoit la geométrie des fluxions d’une coupable hérésie, et les Géomètres,
édules. M. Maclaurin a donné d’ailleurs dans ce même ouvrage, des preuves multipliées de son
pour la géométrie ancienne [Montucla, 1802, p. 11].
est vrai qu’à l’époque de cette dernière attaque, Maclaurin les défendit et établit leurs principes
es démonstrations à la manière des anciens. Mais quelle prolixité fatiguante, quel circuit de
nnemens n’est-il pas obligé d’employer! [Montucla, 1802, p. 270].
God, king, and geometry 383Louis XIV had an inherent (indeed, divine) right to govern; Maclaurin’s theorem had an
inherent (indeed, Euclidean) right to truthhood.
It is always possible to read Cauchy’s claims empirically—indeed, many of his foes would
likely have done so—but such a reading would ignore the introduction’s crucial rhetorical
dimension. In the Manichean cosmology of the manifesto, citations of fact are never merely
that. Nor, for that matter, are rhetorical pairings. Louis XIV and Augustus were not just
two kings from the Classical and recent pasts, but two kings whose power and authority
were grossly evident. Maclaurin’s and Pythagoras’s theorems were not just two mathemat-
ical results, but two mathematical results of iconic importance established through the
Euclidean geometric tradition. The pairings show a corollary normative interpretation
for the citations: kings should be powerful like Louis XIV, theorems should be promul-
gated and justified in the manner of Maclaurin’s.
Louis XIV and Maclaurin’s theorem continue to impart lessons in normative epistemol-
ogy in the next sentence. “I will say more,” Cauchy adds,53 Je
et les
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de l’athe demonstration of this last theorem is comprehensible to a small number of minds,
and the scholars themselves are not all in agreement on the extension one should attri-
bute to it; whereas everyone knows very well by whom France was governed during
the seventeenth century.53There are, for Cauchy, different kinds of truths which call for different methods of verifi-
cation employed by different people. Indeed, the 17th-century king of France not only is at
least as certain as Maclaurin’s theorem, but this certainty is and should be accessible to a
much broader public than that of mathematical truth. Reading Cauchy’s statement in its
manifesto context, Cauchy stipulates not just the empirical claim that far more people
know French political history than can debate the extension of Maclaurin’s theorem, but
that this particular order of things should stand normatively as a model for the rest. For
Cauchy, mathematical truth is not special because it is general. On the contrary, it is special
because it is geometric, and geometry remains a science of the privileged.
In ceding ground to natural scientists, political philosophers, and historians, among
others, Cauchy simultaneously reinforces the borders of mathematics. While the ruler of
France may be a popular question, the validity of Maclaurin’s theorem must not be.
Cauchy’s mathematics is not for everyone, nor does it aspire to be. A committed royalist,
his comparison of Louis XIV and Maclaurin’s theorem advances the principle that
the most universal of truths cannot be entrusted to the most universal of arbiters. His
mathematics was to be one of narrow application and narrow participation. Dispute was
to be confined to elite scholarly circles, and questions of the moral order of society were
to be rigorously excluded. Cauchy elaborates:That which I say here of historical fact can equally apply to a multitude of questions,
religious, moral, and political. We must thus be persuaded that there exist other truths
than the truths of algebra, other realities than sensible objects.54dirai plus; la démonstration de ce dernier théorème est à la portée d’un petit nombre d’esprits,
savans eux-mêmes ne sont pas tous d’accord sur l’étendue qu’on doit lui attribuer; tandis que
e monde sait fort bien par qui la France a été gouvernée dans le dix-septième siècle . . . [Cauchy,
p. vi].
que je dis ici d’un fait historique peut s’appliquer également à une foule de questions, en
on, en morale, en politique. Soyons donc persuadés qu’il existe des vérités autres que les vérités
lgèbre, des réalités autres que les objets sensibles [Cauchy, 1821, p. vii].
384 M.J. BaranyWhat emerges is not a bipartition of knowledge between God and man but a pluripartition
of knowledges amongst a rigidly divided field of scholars and practitioners. Cauchy’s acad-
emy was to be built on the principle of different truths for different disciplines.
It was to be crucial that these truths and methods did not become entangled:55 Cu
doma
pourLet us cultivate the mathematical sciences with ardor, without wanting to extend them
beyond their domain; and we will not imagine that one can attack history with formulae,
nor give theorems in algebra or integral calculus in order to sanction morality.55This last barb has been thought to be directed at Laplace and his use of the theory of prob-
ability to evaluate such things as historical testimony [Belhoste, 1991, pp. 51n27, 219], at
Poisson [Grattan-Guinness, 1990, p. 714], or at theorists of a rational civil order such as
Condorcet [Gilain, 1989, p. 11n59]. Whatever its target, its motive is clear. All of these
men, in the framework of Cauchy’s introduction, engaged in a dangerous entanglement.
Cauchy’s predecessors had improperly conjoined mathematics and nonmathematics just
as they had conflated geometry and algebra. The result was a groundless jumble whose
political manifestation was the wave after wave of upheaval of the French Revolution
and its aftermath. Revolutionaries had contaminated governance with democratic ideals;
atheists misapplied their mundane reasoning to matters divine; mathematicians used their
art beyond the narrow confines within which Cauchy insisted it be kept, both by overex-
tending the outcomes of algebra and by pretending that history and politics could be at-
tacked with formulae. Wrong mathematics, wrong religion, and wrong government came
from the same methodological and epistemological confusion. Stepping out of the proper
domain of geometry is, it is implied, one and the same with stepping out of the proper do-
main of subservience to the Crown. Each represents a departure from what is fundamen-
tally right and true by chasing after imaginary ideals with powerful and dangerous
methods.
5. Conclusion
The introduction concludes with further expressions of thanks toward Poisson, Ampère,
and Coriolis, the latter two of whom are singled out for their mathematical contributions to
the work. In one sense, this short epilogue represents a final layer of displacement to cap an
intricate sequence of placements. Having positioned his course, geometry and algebra, and
mathematics as a whole, Cauchy offers a personal note to displace his own authorship by
acknowledging his debts to his colleagues.
There is a logic to Cauchy’s overall structure. Step by step, the introduction telescopes in
scale, starting with the locus of practice in the École and expanding through general meth-
odological principles to their location in the field of knowledge as a whole. His introduc-
tion’s conclusion reasserts the local work he has just begun, but by displacing rather
than placing he makes the textbook part of the greater negotiation of knowledge and prac-
tice toward which the rest of his introduction builds. The telescoping structure of the intro-
duction asserts that the Course fits within a certain orientation toward methodological
rigor which is in turn situated in a broader epistemology, but it also conversely suggests
the Course’s place at the center of this epistemic universe.ltivons avec ardeur les sciences mathématiques, sans vouloir les étendre au-delà de leur
ine; et n’allons pas nous imaginer qu’on puisse attaquer l’histoire avec des formules, ni donner
sanction à la morale des théorèmes d’algèbre ou de calcul intégral [Cauchy, 1821, p. vii].
God, king, and geometry 385Each part of Cauchy’s positioning was necessary to establish his program of rigor. Con-
sider, for instance, his subtle insistence on the mathematical sense of geometry in the second
act. His commitment in the third act to rigorous mathematics as epistemically apart drew
from and necessitated a mathematical foundation from the second act which was itself
methodologically and epistemically apart. Between the second and third acts, then, brews
a call for philosophical Euclideanism—one combining the methods and intuitions of
Euclid’s geometry. To derive from this a pedagogical mandate, however, required a justifi-
cation at the nexus of the first and second acts. There, Cauchy’s lionization of relations
between real quantities should remind one that he was trained as an engineer, started his
career applying his mathematics in the field, and taught at France’s premier school for
applied mathematics. And while those who draw inspiration from Cauchy’s words today
might think of themselves (and Cauchy) as pure mathematicians, the audience for whom
Cauchy wrote his introduction—including students, administrators, and friendly and hos-
tile colleagues—worked in a world where mathematics and engineering were practically and
theoretically indissociable. The requirements of engineering did not in themselves drive
Cauchy’s mathematical moves, but neither can it be denied that Cauchy’s engineering con-
texts shaped both what Cauchy valued in mathematical analysis and how he could go about
inculcating those values to others.56 Moreover, it cannot be a coincidence that Cauchy
advocates the separation of mathematics from other spheres of knowledge at a time when
the École and his place in it were regularly threatened by the political machinations sur-
rounding them.
Indisputably, Cauchy’s work advanced the practice of mathematics, and even his intro-
duction stresses the new questions opened up by his approach. But Cauchy’s gains were
won by cutting out a wide swath of the field. The disciplinary hygiene espoused in his intro-
duction allowed Cauchy to rule out of bounds a large array of mathematical activity. Con-
fronted with a new class of mathematically educated amateurs and aspirants educated in
elite engineering schools such as the École Polytechnique,57 Cauchy defended his discipline
by policing its modes of right practice. Controlling methods was an integral part of control-
ling access.58 By radically narrowing what could count as right method, Cauchy cut the
ground from underneath a wide body of would-be mathematicians. Of course, Cauchy
was not alone in this ambition, and the disciplinary contraction of mathematics took place
at many levels. Polytechnicians of all stripes rallied around analysis as a challenging and
rigorous method suitable for an elite and highly selective school [Gillispie, 1994, p. 40].5956 To be sure, the connection to engineering is oblique or occluded elsewhere in Cauchy’s work, and
even in other sections of the Course. The relative clarity of engineering’s role in Cauchy’s thought in
his introduction is a mark of the particular audiences, as well as of the particular goals and
strategies, of that portion of his text. Freudenthal [1971, p. 377] reminds us that the philosophical
and mathematical relationship between Cauchy’s Course and the rest of his work is anything but
straightforward.
57 See Alder [1999].
58 Cf. Hunt’s [1991] characterization of the opposition to Oliver Heaviside’s mathematics.
59 See also Terrall [1999, p. 247]. Foundational retrenchments such as Cauchy’s are not uncommon
in histories of restoration-era mathematics, whether the restoration is in seventeenth-century
England [Shapin and Schaffer, 1985] or nineteenth-century Italy [Mazzotti, 1998]. Rather than a
constant increase in rigor and precision, the history of mathematics reflects the cyclical deployment
of foundations and formalisms to suit the social, political, and mathematical needs of its
practitioners—with Euclidean geometry an oft-traded token in historical controversies over
mathematical rigor.
386 M.J. BaranyA product of the many contexts from which it was born, Cauchy’s introduction was opti-
mally placed both to reflect and to help shape a remarkable sea change in European math-
ematics. As a reflection of the movement it helped to define, the introduction offers a
glimpse of the epistemic contortions underlying what on the surface was a simple assertion
of the priority of rigorous mathematics. Taking seriously the web of allusions undergirding
Cauchy’s argument makes plain the conceptual alliances, both likely and unlikely, that
made Cauchy’s rigorous mathematics possible.
Acknowledgments
This paper is for Bob Strichartz, in whose writing I first encountered Cauchy and from whose
mentorship I have gained immeasurably. Among the many people whose insights and assistance
have shaped this paper, I thank Stephanie Kelly, Mike Lynch, Anil Nerode, Suman Seth, Joan
Richards, Bruno Belhoste, June Barrow-Green, Jeremy Gray, Simon Schaffer, David Bell, Michael
Regan, and this article’s two anonymous reviewers. Research and writing for this paper began at
Cornell University and continued under the support of a Marshall Scholarship at the Universities
of Cambridge and Edinburgh. Final revisions to this material were undertaken at Princeton
University while supported by a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship.
References
Alder, K., 1995. A revolution to measure: the political economy of the metric system in France. In:
Wise, M.N. (Ed.), The Values of Precision. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp. 39–71.
Alder, K., 1999. French engineers become professionals; or, how meritocracy made knowledge
objective. In: Clark, W., Golinski, J., Schaffer, S. (Eds.), The Sciences in Enlightened Europe.
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 94–125.
Alexander, A., 2006. Tragic mathematics: romantic narratives and the refounding of mathematics in
the early nineteenth century. Isis 97, 714–726.
Arnold, D.H., 1981. Poisson and mechanics. In: Métivier, M., Costabel, P., Dugac, P. (Eds.), Siméon-
Denis Poisson et la science de son temps. École Polytechnique, Palaiseau.
Belhoste, B., 1984–1985. Le Cours d’analyse de Cauchy à l’Ecole polytechnique en seconde année.
Sciences et techniques en perspective 9, 101–178.
Belhoste, B., 1985. Cauchy, 1789–1857: un mathématicien légitimiste au XIXe siècle. Belin, Paris.
Belhoste, B., 1991. Augustin-Louis Cauchy: A Biography. Springer, New York (translated by F. Ragland).
Belhoste, B., 1994. Un modèle à l’épreuve. L’École polytechnique de 1794 au Second Empire. In:
Belhoste, B., Dahan Dalmedico, A., Picon, A. (Eds.), La formation polytechnicienne: 1794–1994.
Dunod, Paris, pp. 9–30.
Belhoste, B., 2001. The École Polytechnique and mathematics in nineteenth-century France. In:
Bottazzini, U., Dahan Dalmedico, A. (Eds.), Changing Images in Mathematics: From the French
Revolution to the New Millenium. Routledge, London, pp. 15–30.
Belhoste, B., 2003. La formation d’une technocratie: L’École polytechnique et ses élèves de la
Révolution au Second Empire. Belin, Paris.
Benis-Sinaceur, H., 1973. Cauchy et Bolzano. Revue d’histoire des sciences 26 (2), 97–112.
Bernard, P., 1911. Confession (du Concile de Latran au Concile de Trente). In: Vacant, A.,
Mangenot, E. (Eds.), Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, vol. 3. Letouzey, Paris, cols. 894–926.
Bottazzini, U., 1992. Geometrical rigour and ‘modern analysis’, an introduction to Cauchy’s Cours
d’analyse. In: Cauchy, A.L. (Ed.), Cours d’analyse de l’École royale polytechnique, 1ère partie,
Analyse algébrique. CLUEB, Bologna, pp. xi–clxvii.
Bottazzini, U., 2001. From Paris to Berlin: contrasted images of nineteenth-century mathematics. In:
Bottazzini, U., Dahan Dalmedico, A. (Eds.), Changing Images in Mathematics: From the French
Revolution to the New Millenium. Routledge, London, pp. 31–47.
God, king, and geometry 387Boyer, C.B., 1968. A History of Mathematics. John Wiley & Sons, New York.
Bradley, R.E., Sandifer, C.E., 2009. Cauchy’s Cours d’analyse: An Annotated Translation. Springer,
New York.
Cauchy, A.-L., 1821. Cours d’Analyse de l’École Royale Polytechnique; 1re Partie. Analyse
Algébrique. Debure, Paris. Reprint Éditions Jacques Gabay, Sceaux, 1989.
Cauchy, A.-L., 1823. Résumé des Lecons données a l’École Royale Polytechnique, sur le Calcul
Infinitésimal. Debure, Paris.
Chatzis, K., 1994. Mécanique rationnelle et mécanique des machines. In: Belhoste, B., Dahan
Dalmedico, A., Picon, A. (Eds.), La formation polytechnicienne: 1794–1994. Dunod, Paris, pp. 95–
108.
Costabel, P., 1981. Siméon-Denis Poisson: Aspect de l’homme et de son oeuvre. In: Métivier, M.,
Costabel, P., Dugac, P. (Eds.), Siméon-Denis Poisson et la science de son temps. École
Polytechnique, Palaiseau, pp. 1–21.
Dahan Dalmedico, A., 1992. Mathématisations: Augustin-Louis Cauchy et l’École Francaise. A.
Blanchard, Paris.
Dedekind, R., 1948. Essays on the Theory of Numbers. Open Court, La Salle (translated from the
German text of 1901 by W.W. Beman).
Derrida, J., 1974. Of Grammatology. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore (translated by G.C.
Spivak).
Fox, R., 1974. The rise and fall of Laplacian physics. Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences 4,
89–136.
Fraser, C.G., 1997. Calculus and Analytical Mechanics in the Age of Enlightenment. Variorum,
Aldershot.
Freudenthal, H., 1971. Did Cauchy Plagiarize Bolzano?. Archive for History of Exact Sciences 7 (5)
375–392.
Gilain, C., 1989. Cauchy et le Cours d’Analyse de l’Ecole Polytechnique. Bulletin de la Société des
amis de la Bibliothèque de l’École polytechnique 5, 3–145.
Gillispie, C.C., 1994. Un enseignement hégémonique: les mathématiques. In: Belhoste, B., Dahan
Dalmedico, A., Picon, A. (Eds.), La formation polytechnicienne: 1794–1994. Dunod, Paris, pp. 31–
44.
Gillispie, C.C., 1997. Pierre-Simon Laplace 1749–1827. A Life in Exact Science. Princeton University
Press, Princeton.
Gillispie, C.C., 2004. Science and Polity in France: The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Years.
Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Grabiner, J.V., 1981. The Origins of Cauchy’s Rigorous Calculus. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Grabiner, J.V., 1997. Was Newton’s Calculus a Dead End? The Continental Influence of Maclaurin’s
Treatise of Fluxions. The American Mathematical Monthly 104 (5), 393–410.
Grabiner, J.V., 2004. Newton, Maclaurin, and the authority of mathematics. The American
Mathematical Monthly 111 (10), 841–852.
Grattan-Guinness, I., 1970. Bolzano, Cauchy and the ‘new analysis’ of the early nineteenth century.
Archive for History of Exact Sciences 6 (5), 372–400.
Grattan-Guinness, I., 1980. The emergence of mathematical analysis and its foundational progress,
1780–1880. In: Grattan-Guinness, I. (Ed.), From the Calculus to Set Theory, 1630–1910.
Duckworth, London.
Grattan-Guinness, I., 1990. Convolutions in French Mathematics, 1800–1840: From the Calculus
and Mechanics to Mathematical Analysis and Mathematical Physics. Birkhäuser, Basel.
Grosholz, E.R., 1980. Descartes’ unification of algebra and geometry. In: Gaukroger, S. (Ed.),
Descartes: Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics. Harvester Press Ltd., Sussex, pp. 156–168.
Hogben, L., 1960. Mathematics in the Making. Macdonald, London.
Høyrup, J., 1996. The formation of a myth: Greek mathematics—our mathematics. In: Goldstein, C.,
Gray, J., Ritter, J. (Eds.), L’Europe mathématique/Mathematical Europe. Éditions de la Maison
des sciences de l’homme, Paris, pp. 103–122.
388 M.J. BaranyHunt, B.J., 1991. Rigorous discipline: Oliver Heaviside versus the mathematicians. In: Dear, P. (Ed.),
The Literary Structure of Scientific Argument: Historical Studies. University of Pennsylvania
Press, Philadelphia, pp. 72–95.
Iacobacci, R.F., 1965. Augustin-Louis Cauchy and the Development of Mathematical Analysis. New
York University School of Education doctoral dissertation.
Katz, V.J., 2009. A History of Mathematics: An Introduction, third ed. Addison-Wesley, Boston.
Lakatos, I., 1979. In: Worrall, J., Zahar, E. (Eds.), Proofs and Refutations: The Logic of
Mathematical Discovery. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Laugwitz, D., 1987. Infinitely small quantities in Cauchy’s textbooks. Historia Mathematica 14, 258–
274.
Mahoney, M.S., 1980. The beginnings of algebraic thought in the seventeenth century. In:
Gaukroger, S. (Ed.), Descartes: Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics. Harvester Press Ltd.,
Sussex, pp. 141–155.
Mazzotti, M., 1998. The geometers of god: mathematics and reaction in the Kingdom of Naples. Isis
89, 674–701.
Montucla, J.F., 1802. Histoire des mathématiques, nouvelle édition, considérablemennt augmentée,
et prolongée jusque vers l’époque actuelle. Volume III. Henri Agasse, Paris.
Ortolan, T., 1911. Confession. Questions Morales et Pratiques. In: Vacant, A., Mangenot, E. (Eds.),
Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, vol. 3. Letouzey, Paris, cols. 942–960.
Porter, T.M., 1995. Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life.
Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Richards, J.L., 1991. Rigor and clarity: foundations of mathematics in France and England, 1800–
1840. Science in Context 4 (2), 297–319.
Richards, J.L., 1992. God, truth, and mathematics in nineteenth-century England. In: Nye, M.J.,
Richards, J.L., Stuewer, R.H. (Eds.), The Invention of Physical Science: Intersections of
Mathematics, Theology and Natural Philosophy Since the Seventeenth Century. Kluwer
Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, pp. 17–38.
Richards, J.L., 2006. Historical mathematics in the French eighteenth century. Isis 97 (4), 700–713.
Rusnock, A., 1995. Quantification, precision, and accuracy: determinations of population in the
Ancien Régime. In: Wise, M.N. (Ed.), The Values of Precision. Princeton University Press,
Princeton, pp. 17–38.
Shapin, S., Schaffer, S., 1985. Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental
Life. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Terrall, M., 1999. Metaphysics, mathematics, and the gendering of science in eighteenth-century
France. In: Clark, W., Golinski, J., Schaffer, S. (Eds.), The Sciences in Enlightened Europe.
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 246–271.
